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CRISIS MANAGEMENT
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A ‘‘crisis’’ in health care is ‘‘the point in the course of a
disease at which a decisive change occurs, leading either
to recovery or to death’’. The daunting challenges faced by
clinicians when confronted with a crisis are illustrated by a
tragic case in which a teenage boy died after a minor
surgical procedure. Crises are challenging for reasons
which include: presentation with non-specific signs or
symptoms, interaction of complex factors, progressive
evolution, new situations, ‘‘revenge effects’’, inadequate
assistance, and time constraints. In crises, clinicians often
experience anxiety- and overload-induced performance
degradation, tend to use ‘‘frequency gambling’’, run out of
‘‘rules’’ and have to work from first principles, and are
prone to ‘‘confirmation bias’’. The effective management of
crises requires formal training, usually simulator-based,
and ideally in the inter-professional groups who will need
to function as a team. ‘‘COVER ABCD–A SWIFT CHECK’’
is a precompiled algorithm which can be applied quickly
and effectively to facilitate a systematic and effective
response to the wide range of potentially lethal problems
which may occur suddenly in anaesthesia. A set of 25
articles describing additional precompiled responses
collated into a manual for the management of any crisis
under anaesthesia has been published electronically as
companion papers to this article. This approach to crisis
management should be applied to other areas of clinical
medicine as well as anaesthesia.
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‘‘crisis’’ has been defined as ‘‘a turning
point’’ and, in the context of health care,
‘‘the point in the course of a disease at
which a decisive change occurs, leading either to
recovery or to death’’.1 These definitions do not
convey the daunting challenges faced by a
clinician suddenly confronted with having to
respond to a life threatening crisis in clinical
medicine. The task facing the clinician is to
detect that a crisis is at hand, to diagnose its
underlying cause, and to take the necessary steps
to divert the course of the patient’s condition
from impending disaster towards recovery. This
task is not always managed adequately, and the
consequences of this inadequacy are sometimes
tragic.
A substantial body of work has been done on
managing crises during anaesthesia—much of it
using high fidelity simulators.2–8 It has been
clearly shown that experience in itself does not
inoculate against failure, and that even senior
consultants often make apparently basic errors in
crises.9 These errors are understandable, but they
cost lives and expose clinicians in the ‘‘front
line’’ to litigation or even criminal prosecution.10
Crisis management needs to be improved
urgently. This is true in anaesthesia, and also in
other areas of clinical medicine. How is this
improvement to be achieved?
In this article we present an overview of some
of the important reasons why clinical crises
continue to be so challenging and why clinicians
may have difficulty responding appropriately.
Some of these points are illustrated by an
account of a clinical mishap and a case is made
for the use of pre-compiled responses combined,
ideally, with team training. A set of pre-compiled
responses to crises during anaesthesia is pre-
sented in 25 articles which have been published
electronically with this issue of the journal
(box 1).11 The first of these describes how these
responses were developed over a period of
more than 15 years, involving 10 consensus
meetings, each attended by 60–100 anaes-
thetists and human factors experts, and an
exhaustive iterative analysis of 4000 incidents
by a team of over 30 researchers. We argue
that the need for this type of approach is as
great in other fields of medicine as in
anaesthesia.
What messages can be drawn from the
story in box 2 to guide us towards safer
practice in the future?
The obvious message, that the filters used in
anaesthetic circuits can block, is certainly ger-
mane to safety in anaesthesia, but the most
important message is more generic: there is
clearly an urgent need for approaches to the
management of crises in clinical medicine
that are effective and universally accepted,
and that take into account both the challenging
features of clinical crises and the inherent
limitations of human beings. Furthermore, the
practice and artefacts of clinical medicine (pro-
tocols, equipment, drugs) are continuously evol-
ving, so these approaches need to be revised
regularly.
WHY ARE SOME CRISES SO
CHALLENGING?
It is clear when reading incident reports and
observing clinicians attempting to handle crises
in simulators that a number of factors frequently
combine together to make the crises more
challenging.2–16 These are listed in box 3 and are
discussed in the light of the story in box 2.
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Crises may present with opaque, non-specific signs
and symptoms
Of nearly 500 anaesthetic crises which resulted in death, well
over half presented initially with signs as non-specific as
changes in blood pressure, heart rate, and rhythm.14 In the
tragic case of Richard Davis, the presenting features did not
provide a clear indication of what the problem was, although
he was clearly hypoxic. However, the differential diagnosis
for hypoxia is huge. For example, among 179 incidents
presenting with cyanosis or desaturation on pulse oximetry,
there were over 20 different causes as diverse as hypoxic gas
mixtures, unrecognised oesophageal intubation, anaphylaxis,
air embolism, tension pneumothorax, and pulmonary
oedema.15 16 Each of these superficially similar clinical
situations requires an urgent but quite different response
which, if delayed, may lead to death or permanent harm.
Box 1 ‘‘Crisis management during anaesthesia’’ web resource list11
N WB Runciman, MT Kluger, RW Morris, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: the development of an anaesthetic
crisis management manual. Qual Saf Health Care 2005;14:e1.
N T Visvanathan, MT Kluger, RK Webb, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: obstruction of the natural airway.
Qual Saf Health Care 2005;14:e2.
N T Visvanathan, MT Kluger, RK Webb, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: laryngospasm. Qual Saf Health Care
2005;14:e3.
N MT Kluger, T Visvanathan, JA Myburgh, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: regurgitation, vomiting and
aspiration. Qual Saf Health Care 2005;14:e4.
N AD Paix, JA Williamson, WB Runciman. Crisis management during anaesthesia: difficult intubation. Qual Saf Health
Care 2005;14:e5.
N SM Szekely, WB Runciman, RK Webb, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: desaturation. Qual Saf Health Care
2005;14:e6.
N RN Westhorpe, GL Ludbrook, SC Helps. Crisis management during anaesthesia: bronchospasm. Qual Saf Health Care
2005;14:e7.
N MJ Chapman, JA Myburgh, MT Kluger, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: pulmonary oedema. Qual Saf
Health Care 2005;14:e8.
N LM Watterson, RW Morris, RN Westhorpe, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: bradycardia. Qual Saf Health
Care 2005;14:e9.
N LM Watterson, RW Morris, JA Williamson, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: tachycardia. Qual Saf Health
Care 2005;14:e10.
N RW Morris, LM Watterson, RN Westhorpe, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: hypotension. Qual Saf Health
Care 2005;14:e11.
N AD Paix, WB Runciman, BF Horan, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: hypertension. Qual Saf Health Care
2005;14:e12.
N GL Ludbrook, RK Webb, M Currie, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: myocardial ischaemia and infarction.
Qual Saf Health Care 2005;14:e13.
N WB Runciman, RW Morris, LM Watterson, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: cardiac arrest. Qual Saf Health
Care 2005;14:e14.
N AD Paix, MF Bullock, WB Runciman, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: problems associated with drug
administration during anaesthesia. Qual Saf Health Care 2005;14:e15.
N GA Osborne, AK Bacon, WB Runciman, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: awareness and anaesthesia.Qual
Saf Health Care 2005;14:e16.
N JA Williamson, SC Helps, RN Westhorpe, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: embolism.Qual Saf Health Care
2005;14:e17.
N AK Bacon, AD Paix, JA Williamson, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: pneumothorax. Qual Saf Health Care
2005;14:e18.
N M Currie, RK Kerridge, AK Bacon, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: anaphylaxis and allergy. Qual Saf
Health Care 2005;14:e19.
N RJ Singleton, S Kinnear, M Currie, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: vascular access problems. Qual Saf
Health Care 2005;14:e20.
N WM Griggs, RW Morris, WB Runciman, et al. Trauma: development of a sub-algorithm. Qual Saf Health Care
2005;14:e21.
N JA Myburgh, MJ Chapman, SM Szekely, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: sepsis. Qual Saf Health Care
2005;14:e22.
N MT Kluger, SM Szekely, RJ Singleton, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: water intoxication. Qual Saf Health
Care 2005;14:e23.
N MAL Fox, RW Morris, WB Runciman, et al. Crisis management during regional anaesthesia. Qual Saf Health Care
2005;14:e24.
N AK Bacon, RW Morris, WB Runciman, et al. Crisis management during anaesthesia: recovering from a crisis. Qual Saf
Health Care 2005;14:e25.
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Clinical crises often arise from the interaction of many
complex factors
They occur in a ‘‘dynamic environment with complex
interactions between pathophysiology and disease pro-
cesses, staff, infrastructure, equipment, and policies and
procedures’’.10 In Richard’s case the stage was set for disas-
ter by the need for an urgent procedure out-of-hours
in a small hospital, the lack of immediately available skilled
help, Richard’s vulnerability due to his septic state, and a
complex problem which arose suddenly without any
warning.
The problem may evolve, revealing additional layers
of complexity
The situation faced by Dr Gale was exceedingly difficult,
involving multiple factors in a complex and rapidly evolving
emergency which started with a ‘‘patient problem’’ (post-
obstructive pulmonary oedema) and migrated to a very
unusual ‘‘equipment problem’’ (the blockage of a filter), both
of which manifested as difficulty in ventilation of the
patient’s lungs.
The problem faced may not have been encountered
before
Dr Gale had never encountered the particular set of
circumstances that she was faced with. In fact, over two
thirds of iatrogenic incidents in acute care hospitals that lead
to patient harm are rare events which occur only once or
twice a year, or even more infrequently.17 An individual
clinician has no hope of getting a feel for all of these
problems.
Recently introduced processes and equipment may
bring new unforeseen problems
Health care and its artefacts (protocols, drugs, equipment)
are continuously evolving and changing, bringing with them
unforeseen and often unforeseeable new problems that can
suddenly manifest when least expected. The filter blockage in
Richard’s case is a good example. Filters in the breathing
circuit were introduced into anaesthetic practice to protect
patients from cross infection. The blockage of a filter, and the
subsequent harm to a patient, is a form of ‘‘revenge effect’’—
the phenomenon by which an intervention to reduce one risk
actually introduces another, which may remain unforeseen
until a problem occurs.18
Box 2 A tragic case
Richard Davis*, a fit, active 13 year old boy, died after a
minor out-of-hours procedure for an infected knee.12 The
anaesthetic was administered by a senior consultant
anaesthetist, Dr Gale*, and proceeded uneventfully until, at
the end of the procedure, Richard was transferred from the
operating table. At this point he regurgitated and aspirated
at least some gastric contents. He developed difficulty with
breathing. He sat up and removed the laryngeal mask which
had been used to maintain his airway, and then proceeded
to display the signs of acute laryngospasm and, shortly
thereafter, of frothing negative pressure pulmonary oedema.
He was returned to a supine position and his trachea was
intubated by Dr Gale. Dr Gale found it almost impossible to
ventilate Richard’s lungs through the endotracheal tube. She
took appropriate steps to determine that the tube was in the
trachea and not blocked or kinked, and then removed and
replaced it. She went on to perform other tasks one might
expect in the management of a patient whose lungs and
circulation were progressively deteriorating (the administra-
tion of 100% oxygen and of adrenaline, for example). She
called for help very early in the development of this crisis, but
effective help (in the form of an anaesthetic colleague
who had to come in from home) took nearly 30 minutes to
arrive. The contribution of junior doctors on the ‘‘arrest
team’’, who arrived earlier, was ineffectual. Richard’s
condition deteriorated rapidly. When the second anaesthetist
arrived, Dr Gale handed him the reservoir bag of the
anaesthetic circuit to hold while she suctioned the endo-
tracheal tube again. The bag did not deflate through
the disconnected circuit alerting the second anaesthetist to
the fact that the filter used to protect the anaesthetic breath-
ing circuit had become blocked, presumably by the frothing
pulmonary oedema. Removing the filter restored adequate
ventilation, but Richard had unfortunately developed irrever-
sible brain damage by this stage and life support was
discontinued the following day.
A charge of manslaughter
At Dr Gale’s subsequent trial for manslaughter—for failing to
recognise that the filter was blocked—evidence was pre-
sented to the effect that this blockage could not have occurred
until quite late in the proceedings when the froth in the circuit
started to dry and encrust the surface of the hydrophobic
filter. All four expert witnesses called in the case said that the
general conduct of the resuscitation was within the limits of
acceptable practice, and none was prepared to criticise
without reservation Dr Gale’s failure to identify the problem
with the filter. There was some criticism of the fact that she
had not followed a crisis management algorithm known as
‘‘COVER’’ which had been published in the anaesthetic
literature some years previously13 (see table 1), particularly in
that she had not eliminated the patient breathing circuit and
replaced it with a self-inflating bag as a formal diagnostic
manoeuvre to distinguish between a patient related problem
and an equipment related problem. However, it was
accepted that not all anaesthetists agree that an algorithm
based approach is the best way to manage a crisis.
Moreover, this algorithm at that time did not explicitly
require the elimination of filters because the problem of a
blocked filter had not been anticipated or previously reported
(the use of filters in anaesthetic circuits represents a relatively
recent evolution in practice). The protocol has subsequently
been modified in this regard, but would have been deficient
at the time of this particular case.
*The case is a genuine one, the names are pseudonyms.
Box 3 Factors which may conspire together to
make crises challenging
N They may present with opaque, non-specific signs or
symptoms.
N They may arise from the interaction of many complex
factors.
N The problems may evolve, revealing additional layers
of complexity.
N The particular set of circumstances may never have
been encountered before.
N Recently introduced processes and equipment may
bring new unforeseen problems.
N Skilled assistance may not be available in the
necessary time frame.
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Skilled assistance may not be available in the
necessary time frame
In Richard’s case, the junior medical staff available provided
no useful assistance in the diagnosis or management of the
problem, and more skilled help (although called for very
promptly) was not immediately to hand.
Crises may have to be resolved very rapidly if disaster
is to be averted
Many medical crises can lead to irreversible brain damage
within minutes—especially those involving a problem (or,
in Richard’s case, more than one problem) in the
complex chain of oxygen delivery from a source of gas to
the tissues.
WHY DO CLINICIANS HAVE DIFFICULTY
RESPONDING APPROPRIATELY TO SOME CRISES?
Cognitive strategies and work practices which have
evolved for speed and efficiency under normal working
conditions may become maladaptive in uncertain or unusual
circumstances.13 19 20 A number of factors which can
affect human performance in a crisis may conspire together
to impede the rapid resolution of a dangerous problem
(box 4).
Table 1 Crisis management algorithm – memorise and practise: ‘‘COVER ABCD’’ as
published in 199313 (the sequence is ‘‘AB COVER CD’’ when the patient is breathing
spontaneously)
C1 Circulation Establish adequacy of peripheral circulation (rate, rhythm and
character of pulse). If pulseless, institute cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR). The core algorithm must still be completed
as soon as possible.
C2 Colour Note saturation. Examine for evidence of central cyanosis.
Pulse oximetry is superior to clinical detection and is
recommended. Test probe on own finger, if necessary, whilst
proceeding with O1 and O2.
O1 Oxygen Check rotameter settings, ensure inspired mixture is not
hypoxic.
O2 Oxygen analyser Adjust inspired oxygen concentration to 100% and note that
only the oxygen flowmeter is operating. Check that the oxygen
analyser shows a rising oxygen concentration distal to the
common gas outlet.
V1 Ventilation Ventilate the lungs by hand to assess breathing circuit integrity,
check the patency of the catheter mount, connector and filter*,
airway patency, chest compliance and air entry by ‘‘feel’’ and
careful observation and auscultation. Also inspect capnography
trace.
V2 Vaporiser Note settings and levels of agents. Check all vaporiser filler
ports, seatings and connections for liquid or gas leaks during
pressurisation of the system. Consider the possibility of the
wrong agent being in the vaporiser.
E1 Endotracheal tube Systematically check the endotracheal tube (if in use). Ensure
that it is patent with no leaks or kinks or obstructions (see
suggested protocol in Anaesth Intensive Care 1993;21:615).
Check capnograph for tracheal placement and oximeter for
possible endobronchial position. If necessary, adjust, deflate
cuff, pass a catheter, or remove and replace.
E2 Elimination Eliminate the anaesthetic machine and ventilate with self-
inflating (e.g. Air Viva) bag with 100% oxygen (from alternative
source if necessary). Retain gas monitor sampling port (but be
aware of possible problems).
R1 Review monitors Review all monitors in use (preferably oxygen analyser,
capnograph, oximeter, blood pressure, electrocardiograph
(ECG), temperature and neuromuscular junction monitor). For
proper use, the algorithm requires all monitors to have been
correctly sited, checked and calibrated.
R2 Review equipment Review all other equipment in contact with or relevant to the
patient (e.g. diathermy, humidifiers, heating blankets,
endoscopes, probes, prostheses, retractors and other
appliances).
A Airway Check patency of the unintubated airway. Consider
laryngospasm or presence of foreign body, blood, gastric
contents, nasopharyngeal or bronchial secretions.
B Breathing Assess pattern, adequacy and distribution of ventilation.
Consider, examine and auscultate for bronchospasm,
pulmonary oedema, lobar collapse and pneumo- or
haemothorax.
C Circulation Repeat evaluation of peripheral perfusion, pulse, blood
pressure, ECG and filling pressures (where possible) and any
possible obstruction to venous return, raised intrathoracic
pressure (e.g. inadvertent PEEP) or direct interference to (e.g.
stimulation by central line) or tamponade of the heart. Note any
trends on records.
D Drugs Review intended (and consider possible unintended) drug or
substance administration. Consider whether the problem may
be due to unexpected effect, a failure of administration or
wrong dose, route or manner of administration of an intended
or ‘‘wrong drug’’. Review all possible routes of drug
administration.
*The updated wording in bold resulted from the case described in box 2.
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The usual cognitive strategy, ‘‘frequency gambling’’,
may be counterproductive in a crisis
Doctors are taught to look for common problems and not
to be unduly enticed by the possibility of the unusual.
‘‘Frequency gambling’’ (in a medical context) involves
choosing the most likely diagnosis without formally exclud-
ing all alternatives. This is a cognitive strategy necessary to
function in complex environments,20 but one which mitigates
against the diagnosis of an unusual problem. A blocked filter
had not been reported in the first 2000 incidents submitted to
the Australian Incident Monitoring Study.21
The clinician may run out of rules or apply the wrong
rules
Human beings function preferentially by pattern recognition
and the use of ‘‘rules’’ to navigate routine tasks efficiently.20 In
a crisis, those situations that can be resolved on the basis of the
clinician’s resources of pre-stored, rule-based responses to
situations identified by pattern recognition from past experi-
ence usually are resolved on this basis. It is when the clinician
runs out of rule-based responses, or when an inappropriate
rule is applied, that the situation moves out of control. At this
stage it becomes necessary to work from first principles.
Working from first principles, although powerful, may
be too slow and laborious to be effective in a crisis
The capacity of human beings to work things out from first
principles (so called knowledge-based or deliberative reason-
ing) is impressive, but it is laborious and time consum-
ing.12 13 20 Rule-based decisions can be made almost
instantaneously; thinking things out from first principles is
slow and demanding of concentration, which may be
compromised if the clinician’s arousal increases beyond the
point of optimal performance.22
Anxiety engendered by imminent disaster may
degrade performance
This is almost inevitable in the nightmare-like circumstances
of trying to save the life of a previously well patient whose
condition continues inexorably to deteriorate despite
repeated and increasingly desperate attempts to turn around
the crisis. This is one of the advantages of getting prompt
assistance from helpers with less emotional investment in the
case. When the other anaesthetist arrived to help Dr Gale, he
had no knowledge of the progression of events, no
preconceived idea of the problem, and was less inhibited by
anxiety. The situation is analogous to that in which Brian
Mehler arrived in the control room of the nuclear power
station at Three Mile Island and, with ‘‘fresh eyes’’, was able
to avert catastrophe by identifying the nature of a problem
that had eluded the fifty operators, engineers, and super-
visors who had been present during the evolution of the
crisis.23
The workload may be excessive in a crisis
In a crisis there may be multiple tasks needing simultaneous
organisation and execution, leading to ‘‘overload’’ and a
degradation in performance. This is in contrast to the
‘‘everyday’’ workload which involves fewer sequential tasks.
A ‘‘mind set’’ may lead to ‘‘confirmation bias’’
The tendency to interpret new information as supportive of
an early view of events (even when the new information
might, in fact, be pointing elsewhere) is known as
‘‘confirmation bias’’.20 For someone in Dr Gale’s position,
identifying a blocked filter as an isolated problem at the
beginning of a case would be quite different from diagnosing
a late blockage in the context of numerous other problems.
Dr Gale had used the circuit (including the filter) for
Richard’s entire anaesthetic without difficulty. More than
one person had noted that air entry into the chest was
present during the developing crisis (which would have been
incompatible with a completely blocked filter, at least at that
stage). There was clear evidence of a genuine patient-related
problem—frothing pulmonary oedema. Each newly acquired
fact would have been added to Dr Gale’s developing mental
picture of what became, with the passage of time, a ‘‘strong
but wrong’’ impression of the situation.20 ‘‘Fixation errors’’
may not only manifest in this way—‘‘it’s this and only
this’’—but also as ‘‘it’s anything but this’’ or as ‘‘this can’t be
happening’’, leading to failure to commit to effective
management.24
THE NEED FOR PRE-COMPILED RESPONSES
Dr Gale was found not guilty. Her responses were considered
to constitute reasonable practice, so this was not a case of
criminal negligence.12 In fact, this tragedy occurred in the
hands of a well motivated, conscientious, fully trained,
experienced, medically qualified, specialist anaesthetist
who was present in the operating room throughout the
case, who was not in any way impaired, and who was held
by four experts to have been practising to a reasonable
standard. Thus, we have to conclude that, even in skilled
hands, the current standards of crisis management may fall
short of the aim of the Anaesthesia Patient Safety
Foundation, that ‘‘no patient shall be harmed by the effects
of anaesthesia’’.25
We have to accept that there will always be challenges
that exceed any person’s ability to react adequately and
in time, if he or she has to rely entirely on memorised rules
supplemented by thinking from first principles.12 We are
convinced that the crisis faced by Dr Gale would have been
extremely difficult for any anaesthetist to handle on this
basis.
On the other hand, the problem may not have been
inherently impossible to resolve if appropriate ‘‘pre-com-
piled’’ algorithms had been available in writing. The use of a
systematic pre-compiled response would, at the very least,
have increased the chance of identifying those aspects of the
crisis amenable to treatment. Even if we assume that the
early laryngospasm and pulmonary oedema were severe
enough to overwhelm conventional treatment to the extent
that brain death preceded the blockage of the filter, at least
we would have known that that was the case if the blockage
had been found and corrected as soon as it occurred. The
tragedy in cases such as this lies, to a large extent, in the
possibility that the outcome could have been averted by
relatively simple means.
Box 4 Factors which can affect human
performance in a crisis
N The usual cognitive strategy, ‘‘frequency gambling’’,
may be counterproductive in a crisis.
N The clinician may run out of rules or apply the wrong
rules.
N Working from first principles, although powerful, may
be too slow and laborious.
N Anxiety engendered by imminent disaster may
degrade performance.
N The workload may be excessive in a crisis.
N A ‘‘mind set’’ may lead to ‘‘confirmation bias’’ (that is,
new information is discarded).
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DEVELOPING PRE-COMPILED RESPONSES
As the exact manifestation of future problems is impossible
to predict, the best approach is to try, ahead of time, to work
out from first principles all that can go wrong, taking into
account reports of things that have gone wrong. The aim is to
develop a structured approach which will be clear and quick
to follow and which will cover all contingencies.
Algorithms for crisis management are often divided into a
‘‘phase 1’’ or ‘‘learned response’’ where some immediate
actions are taken, backed up by some written instructions
(the ‘‘phase 2’’ response).13 Phase 2 responses should be
understandable to people who are not necessarily very
experienced or particularly skilled in that discipline; this
may be important when emergency procedures have to be
carried out after hours in small hospitals, as was the case
with Richard Davis. This two phase approach was taken in
developing a core algorithm for anaesthesia crises repre-
sented by the mnemonic COVER ABCD–A SWIFT CHECK.
The initial component of this algorithm can be learned and
practised (see table 1) and can then be backed up by an easy-
reference manual with supplementary sub-algorithms for
specific problems. These sub-algorithms, and how they were
developed, are presented as a set of 25 articles which
accompany this overview (box 1).11
The concept of the necessity for a core algorithm had its
origins in 1988,26 and an early version of COVER, checked
against the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian
Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS), was published in 1993.13
It permits 60% of all problems reported in these 2000
incidents to be addressed in 40–60 seconds and leads onto
24 sub-algorithms covering more than 99% of the remaining
problems.
Gaba et al published a comprehensive book on crisis
management in anaesthesia in the year after the publication
of COVER.24 Commendably comprehensive algorithms are
provided for 10 ‘‘generic events’’ and a further 73 ‘‘specific
events’’. Most of the core ‘‘steps’’ in COVER for an initial
response to a severe event are recommended, but the book
does not advocate always starting with a standard sequence
of actions. The possibility therefore exists of choosing the
wrong algorithm. For example, if the ‘‘hypoxaemia’’ or
‘‘cardiac arrest’’ algorithm had been chosen in Richard’s case
there would have been no direct recommendation to replace
the breathing circuit, whereas if the algorithm for ‘‘high peak
inspiratory pressure’’ had been chosen there would have been
(this occurs at the ‘‘E’’ (eliminate) stage of COVER, table 1).
It is necessary to strike a balance between a comprehensive
compendium of detailed responses to all possible events and
a simple set of recommendations which will be of practical
value in a crisis in which the diagnosis has yet to be made.
The COVER algorithm itself has been criticised for being too
complex.27 The optimal level of detail for a crisis management
tool to be used by the average practitioner has not been
determined. The use of algorithms in crisis management has
not yet gained universal acceptance. Important work remains
to be done in this area.
ACCOMPANYING PUBLICATIONS
A crisis management manual was published by the
Australian Patient Safety Foundation in 199628 and has since
been updated. The manual has been crosslinked within an
Australian Society of Anaesthetists’ on-line teaching module
which is in preparation.29 The pre-compiled responses in this
manual were developed largely on the basis of an analysis of
successfully managed crises, as recorded by anaesthetists in
relevant AIMS reports, checked against the first 4000
incidents reported to AIMS27 and iteratively modified on
the basis of wide consultation and feedback. They are
published electronically in 25 papers which accompany this
issue of the journal.11 There are limitations to the approach
outlined in the manual,27 and it is so far supported only by
evidence at level IV.30 Nevertheless, the approach is rational
and the 24 sub-algorithms, correctly used, should handle
more than 99% of the crises faced by an anaesthetist.
Much remains to be done. Carefully designed simulation-
based studies should be undertaken to evaluate the
approaches advocated against possible alternatives and to
systematically refine the sub-algorithms.27 The greatest
limitation may, in fact, be in how successfully the recom-
mendations are applied. For example, 58% of trainees made
major errors in the management of a cardiac arrest in a
simulator, in spite of the fact that this is one crisis for which
there are accepted recommendations with which anaesthe-
tists are supposed to be familiar.31
THE NEED FOR TRAINING
The successful management of crises requires formal training
and regular practice.32–34 However, such training and practice
is still the exception rather than the rule in anaesthesia (let
alone the rest of medicine), although there is now a
simulator-based course in Australia and New Zealand for
the ‘‘Effective Management of Anaesthetic Crises’’. Most
anaesthetists spend the vast majority of their time on the
provision of routine, relatively uneventful anaesthesia, not on
crisis management. This problem pertains to other activities
as well, such as aviation and monitoring the function of
nuclear power plants. Reason has called it ‘‘the catch-22 of
human supervisory control’’.20
One of the reasons some anaesthetists may not have
availed themselves of crisis management training appears to
be the psychological phenomenon known as ‘‘optimist bias’’,
in which most individual members of a group view and
report their abilities as better than the average of the group—
a clearly impossible state of affairs.35–37 If individuals believe
they can fall back on their (‘‘superior’’) ability to handle
crises from past experience and from first principles, they are
unlikely to be highly motivated to spend time and effort on
training.
There are compelling reasons for training in crisis manage-
ment to be conducted in interprofessional teams. For
example, managing a difficult airway requires several people
to cooperate closely in a tight time frame.38 Yet, doctors and
nurses, who routinely have to work together in managing
these problems, rarely train for this important eventuality in
teams. The concept of crew (or crisis) resource management
(CRM) training has been highlighted as a valuable tool in the
management of crises in aviation.39 There has been an
extensive body of work applying these concepts to anaes-
thesia.2–8 32–34 40
THE NEED FOR ONGOING SURVEILLANCE
COVER was updated in light of the new information that
emerged from Richard’s case (see footnote to table 1). The
need for ongoing collection of information about things that
go wrong is increasing as the pace of medical advances
quickens. This information should be collated in large
databases and made available to all who need it. The
databases should include detailed information from near-
miss incidents and from occasions when patients have been
harmed (‘‘sentinel’’ and adverse events), collated using a
common classification from reviews, incident reports, audits,
medical records, complaints, legal files, registers, root cause
analyses, and coronial recommendations. This will maximise
the chance of any new dangerous problem being ‘‘designed
out’’ of the system, included in relevant algorithms, or at
least of being brought to everyone’s attention, ideally before
patients are harmed.41
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CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN OTHER AREAS OF
CLINICAL MEDICINE
Although protocols exist for the management of a variety of
acute clinical conditions (beyond the boundaries of anaes-
thesia) at a local hospital level (for example, hypertension,
eclampsia, dysrhythmias), only a few have been published42
or are widely accepted. One exception is the approach known
as Early Management of Severe Trauma (EMST)43 and as
Advanced Trauma Life Support.44 This was originally devel-
oped by a practitioner whose relatives were poorly managed
after suffering multiple trauma at a remote location, has now
been widely adopted, and has undoubtedly improved the
management of acute trauma. EMST training is undertaken
in teams (and may be regularly updated), but these teams
still seldom include nurses.
The need for algorithms and team training has been
identified in several other areas—for example, problems with
cardiopulmonary bypass.45 The longest standing widely
accepted crisis management protocols are those for cardiac
arrest. These have been progressively refined over half a
century and are often nationally endorsed.46 47 Many hospi-
tals require staff to be ‘‘certified’’, sometimes at yearly
intervals. It is now recognised that most patients do not
suffer a cardiac arrest ‘‘out of the blue’’; on the contrary,
there are sufficient prodromal signs in the majority of cases
for 6–8 hours before an arrest to allow a medical emergency
team (MET) to be called at a time when it is possible to avert
the impending crisis.48 49 Evidence is accumulating that this
approach is associated with fewer cardiac arrests, fewer
unexpected intensive care admissions and, possibly, improve-
ments in hospital safety and an overall reduction in hospital
mortality.50–52 However, to date there does not seem to be
widespread realisation that the majority of MET calls are for a
limited number of problems which are amenable to a
structured approach. Such an approach would reduce
variability in diagnostic and therapeutic interventions and
decrease the likelihood of overlooking some of the more
unusual problems when they do occur.
CONCLUSIONS
Many crises in clinical medicine are managed poorly,
exposing patients to harm and clinicians to litigation. We
as doctors owe it to our patients to make sure that
contemporary knowledge of cognitive function and human
performance is incorporated into our practice, so that the
chance of avoiding potentially preventable disasters is always
optimised. Anaesthetists have led the way in this endeavour,
but much remains to be done. Not all anaesthetists have
accepted the need for this approach and there is substantial
scope for crisis management algorithms to be developed and
adopted in a number of other areas in clinical medicine. A
start has been made by the development of a set of tools
which is underpinned by the 25 papers which accompany this
article.
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